Hillary Clinton made a major foreign policy statement yesterday offering her approval of the Iranian nuclear deal. However, her remarks were more interesting because they provide us an opportunity to understand her worldview and assumptions about foreign policy. While both Clinton and Obama share liberal internationalist strategies, both understand the role of the United States relative to other great powers differently, and thus make different assumptions about America’s role in world politics. Ikenberry’s recent work on American grand strategy provides a useful way to understand these different versions of liberal internationalist grand strategy.
Take Hillary’s discussion of how she would approach Iran if elected president. Her “distrust but verify” principle implies that Iranian commitments to the US are unlikely to be uphold in the absence of some coercive threat (snapback sanctions in this case). It also suggests that the US should be wary of making further commitments in Iran, an assumption reinforced by her proposal to confront Iranian influence across the region. This demonstrates a base belief that Iran’s emergent hegemony is entirely contrary to American interests in the region and that those interests must be forcefully reasserted. Her clear and unambiguous support of Israel is a major part of the restoration of an American-led regional order, despite the fact that the current Obama administration does not view Israel as a partner in regional stability.
In calling for a renewal of American regional hegemony, Clinton is articulating a liberal internationalist strategy consistent with what Ikenberry has described as liberal internationalism 2.5. Such a strategy attempts to renegotiate the terms of American leadership and preserve worldwide hegemony by making itself subject to some rules but not others. Hillary’s approach to the nuclear deal reflects this type of strategy – she accepts it as a temporary limit on American action with regard to Iran but reserves the right to unilaterally use military force while bolstering its relationship with Israel.
While Hillary tolerates some political openness by virtue of her acceptance of the nuclear deal, an American military capability is always at the ready to enforce that new global order. This is further evident in her discussion of Syria and Ukraine, two areas in which she believes the United States must act more forcefully to confront both Assad and Putin. These statements position Hillary as a hawkish liberal internationalist, one willing to flex American muscle to uphold American principles of liberal order.
What’s fascinating is that this position isn’t necessarily that far from that of some neoconservatives. Robert Kagan, who wants the US to avoid superpower retirement, is generally seen as supportive of Clinton and has made moves toward the political center, like working at Brookings rather than a standard right-wing think tank. Same for others like Max Boot. Both would approve Clinton’s past criticism of Obama on Syria, arguing that he has not done enough to support Syrian rebels. As for the US role in the world, she argues that the US can’t “hunker down”. The problem isn’t American leadership. Instead, it’s one of messaging: “One issue is that we don’t even tell our own story very well these days.”
On the other hand, Obama’s foreign policy is edging away from liberal internationalism 2.5 and more toward 3.0. According to Ikenberry, version 3.0 would see the United States resolve global problems using highly multilateral and networked processes among many great powers, including potential adversaries. This is a post-hegemonic posture that seeks to maintain the liberal world order created by the United States through great power cooperation, including diplomacy with adversaries and rival hegemons. The P5+1 diplomacy that led to the Iran deal is precisely the kind of engagement that would be pursued by a post-hegemon, and such a strategy would use this diplomatic success as a way to build consensus on solving other problems faced by all major powers.
What’s the difference between these two versions of internationalism? 3.0 would involve a much higher degree of strategic restraint and an acceptance of the limitations of American power. Obama’s “don’t do stupid stuff” principle is quite consistent with restraint and demonstrates a loss of faith in the use of unilateral military force. Given her assumption that the US must restore its hegemony, Clinton would have much fewer qualms regarding coercive activities.
Overall, these two different versions of liberal internationalism serve as the major grand strategic alternatives for foreign policy in the Democratic Party. Which makes one wonder: will other candidates (Sanders, O’Malley) articulate a foreign policy more consistent with Obama’s liberalism 3.0? Or, more interestingly, might it might possible to develop a strategy that even goes beyond 3.0, or for that matter, even beyond liberalism?